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Abstract  The Markowitz  Model of Utility supplemented with a small degree of 
Probability Distortion  as an explanation of  Outcomes of Allais Experiments over 
Large and Small Payoffs and Gambling on Unlikely Outcomes. 
 
We show that in principal only a small degree of probability distortion is necessary 
for agents  to exhibit the Allais paradox. We also show that the choices observed in 
the Allais experiments employing small real payoffs cannot be explained by 
Cumulative Prospect Theory  without the assumption of low degrees of  probability 
distortion that  rule out gambling at unfair odds on all but the most extreme longshots 
in CPT. 
Given these  points we show  that  the  Markowitz model of utility supplemented by a 
small degree of probability distortion  can explain the majority choices involved 
Allais experiments and other experiments  as well as gambling at actuarially unfair 
odds.  
 
Keywords: Allais Paradox, Markowitz model of Utility,  Cumulative Prospect 
Theory;; Gambling. 
 
JEL classification: C72; C92; D80; D84 
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The Markowitz  Model of Utility supplemented with a small degree of Probability 
Distortion  as an explanation of  Outcomes of Allais Experiments over Large and 
Small Payoffs and Gambling on Unlikely Outcomes. 
D.A.Peel*,  Zhang, Jie*   and D.Law** 
 
*University of Lancaster  
**University of Bangor 
 
Introduction 
 
In a seminal paper Markowitz (1952) proposed a new model of utility. Unlike in 
standard expected utility theory he assumed that from agents customary or normal 
level of wealth the agent was initially risk-loving then risk-averse over gains whilst 
initially risk-adverse then risk-seeking over losses. Though perhaps not widely 
appreciated the agent was also assumed to be loss averse.1Apart from explaining 
simultaneous gambling and insurance the Markowitz model can also explain a variety 
of experimental evidence not consistent with standard expected utility theory. 2
1 Markowitz writes, “Generally people avoid symmetric bets. This suggests that the 
curve falls faster to the left of the origin than it rises to the right. We may assume that 
U X U X X( ) ( ), > > 0 where X = 0 is customary wealth.  ” (pp154-155)”.  His 
diagram did not appear to exhibit this feature but the text p(155)  and discussion 
makes it very clear that he assumes  loss aversion. 
2 This is because often the experimental evidence that  conflicts with standard 
expected utility is explicable in terms of reference point effects or loss aversion and 
not probability distortion per-se. The Markowitz model through changes in the 
reference point, due to an increase in wealth, can explain the apparent preference of 
some agents for segregated gains reported by Thaler (1985, p. 203). The reference 
point effect can also explain why agents might turn down one gamble such as  lose 
$100 or win $150 with win-probability 0.5, but accept  a sequence of N such bets, say, 
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3
However important experimental evidence that the Markowitz model cannot explain 
is the Allais paradox, (see e.g. Allais (1953)).  As is well known resolving this 
paradox requires that agents’ subjective probabilities differ from objective 
probabilities. In the Markowitz model they are assumed equal. 
Cumulative Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and 
Kahnerman (1992) (KT) is now perhaps become the major alternative to expected 
utility theory having superseded Markowitz’s model. 3 Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(CPT) embodies the reference point hypothesis of Markowitz but restricts preferences 
to be solely risk-averse over gains and solely risk-loving over loses. KT also assume 
loss aversion but suggest it is of higher order of magnitude4 over small stakes than 
that that Markowitz would accept.5 To explain both the Allais paradox over large 
hypothetical returns and gambling on actuarially unfair outcomes KT assume that the 
probabilities of events are subjectively distorted by agents, via an inverted s-shaped 
probability weighting function so that small probabilities are over-estimated and large 
probabilities are understated. The probabilities are assigned to outcomes employing a 
 
N=100. As shown by Samuelson (1963) such behaviour is inconsistent with standard 
expected utility theory  
 
3 There are 193 citations to the Markowitz model in Google scholar (nov2006). This 
compares to 4625 to the KT 1979 paper and 1136 to their 1992 paper. 
4 In particular, the function is postulated to fall roughly twice as fast over losses as it 
rises over gains, exhibiting diminishing sensitivity as the marginal impact of losses or 
gains diminishes with distance from the reference point [see e.g. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992)].  
 
5 He writes, “for very small symmetric bets the loss in utility from the bet is negligible 
and is compensated for by the “fun of participation”.  
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similar cumulative weighting function to that developed by Quiggin.6 CPT is in 
principle able to explain the Allais paradox, a variety of other experimental evidence 
inconsistent with standard expected utility theory as well as gambling at actuarially 
unfair odds. However it is now known from analysis by Neilson and Stowe (2002) 
that power value functions7, assumed by KT in their parametric specification, cannot 
explain with the same parameter values both the Allais paradox over large returns and 
gambling over unlikely outcomes. Neilson and Stowe (2002), state that the most 
obvious conclusion of their work is that alternative functional forms are needed. 8
6 Note that if all outcomes are losses, the cumulative prospect preference function in 
(2) is identical to the rank-dependent expected utility preference function (e.g. 
Quiggin (1993)). Both apply the probability weighting function to the probability of 
the lowest outcome first. If all outcomes are gains the preference function in (1) 
differs from the rank dependent 
expected utility preference function by applying the weighting function to the 
probability of the highest outcome first. 
7 This conflicts with Markowitz who assumed bounded value functions. He wrote   “ 
to avoid the famous St.Petersburg Paradox, or its generalization by Cramer, I assume 
that the utility function is bounded from above. For analogous reasons I assume it to 
be bounded from below.” (p154) 
 
8 Neilson and Stowe endeavoured to explain the Allais paradox in an experiment 
involving millions. It is known from the celebrated results of Rabin (2000) that a 
utility function calibrated for low-stakes gambles implies unreasonable behaviour for 
high-stakes gambles, and vice-versa. Because their experiments involved only gains 
the same results will hold for cumulative prospect theory preferences. However, 
Neilson and Stowe also show that parameter combinations that are compatible with 
choices expressed in gambles with small monetary outcomes are also inconsistent 
with parameter values that imply “reasonable” threshold probabilities between 
gambling and insurance. 
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A recent Allais experiment of List and Haigh (2005), using small real stakes, reports 
statistical significance of the Allais paradox in responses from both professional 
traders and students. However the majority of professional traders or students choose 
the risky option in both Allais questions so that the majority response does not reveal 
the Allais paradox. The choice patterns observed in the List and Haigh experiments is 
a common, though not universal finding, in Allais experiments involving small real 
stakes where often the choices do not reveal the Allais paradox.  E.g.Conlisk (1989), 
Harrison (1994) and Burke et al. (1996) and also Ballinger et al. (1997), Battalio etal. 
(1990) Bernasconoi (1994), Camerer (1989), Kagel et al. (1990), Starmer and Sugden 
(1989) and Wu and Gonzalez (1996).  
Choice of the risky options in the Allais experiments employing small real stakes 
contrasts with choices in the Allais experiments involving large, hypothetical, stakes. 
In these experiments the great majority of agents choose the certain outcome in one of 
the two questions (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). Accepting the validity of 
these hypothetical experiments we can make two points. First if the differing choices 
in Allais experiments employing small and larger stakes are to have a consistent 
choice theoretic explanation then, ceteris paribus, the power specification of the value 
function is invalid since the choice pattern is dependent on the size of the payoffs.9
9 The recent empirical results of Holt and Laury are also particularly important in 
this context. They use real payoffs as well as hypothetical payoffs and find that risk 
aversion increases sharply as payoffs are scaled up as agents choose between a 
“safer” and “more risky” gamble. Both sets of experiments suggest that that 
increases in payoff levels increase risk aversion. With a power value function this 
would not occur. Since these experiments use small stakes the issue is not about the 
validity of the power function as an approximation over large or small stakes. We 
also note that some early experimental evidence, e.g. Markowitz (1952), Biswanger 
(1980) and Hershey and Shoemaker (1980) is also inconsistent with a power value 
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Second agents may make choices consistent with the expected utility model even 
though they may suffer from probability distortion. Probability distortion is a 
necessary condition to exhibit the Allais paradox but not sufficient. This point has not 
apparently been fully appreciated in the literature.  We show why in Allais 
experiments employing small the relative returns employed in components of the 
gamble will be expected to elicit preferences that display very different evidence for 
the paradox even when agents are assumed to exhibit the same degree of probability 
distortion.  
The question arises as to the degree of probability distortion that is required to explain 
the preferences exhibited by agents in the Allais paradox over small and large stakes. 
In fact, the degree of probability distortion required to explain the Allais paradox can, 
as we show, be epsilon small. However we also show that the degree of probability 
distortion required in the KT model to induce agents to act as if risk-seeking, and thus 
engage in actuarially unfair gambles on long shots, translates into subjective expected 
 
function. In these experiments the probabilities, in a sequence of gambles, are kept 
fixed as agents choose between a gamble and its certainty equivalent.  Choices 
change significantly with size of payoff. Finally we note some theoretical objections 
to the power assumption. Blavatsky (2005) shows that the Kahneman-Tversky 
parameterization cannot resolve the St. Petersburg paradox unless the power 
coefficient of the utility function is less than that of the probability weighting 
function.  However, this implies that the agent cannot exhibit risk-loving behavior 
and so gamble. Also the agent becomes infinitely gain loving over small enough 
stakes violating the loss aversion assumption, see e.g. Cain et al (2005) and  
Köbberling and Wakker (2004). 
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rates of return that can run into hundreds of percent. Regardless of ones view of 
learning these sorts of subjective return appear too large to be systematic. Even 
assuming a small degree of probability distortion- in the third decimal point- we show 
that the subjective expected returns differ from the objective by a few percent.  
Given these points we illustrate with a parametric specification how the Markowitz 
model, supplemented with a small degree of probability distortion, is able to 
parsimoniously explain, unlike CPT, majority choices in both experimental evidence 
such as the Allais paradox, other important experiments such as Holt and Laury 
(2002) also involving real stakes, as well as gambling at actuarially unfair odds. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Our analysis is set out in section 1 and 
the final section offers our conclusions.  
Section1 
We assume that the value function over gains, UG , is given by the expo-power 
function of Saha (1993). 
UG e rGn=  1 (1) 
where G is gains and r, n are positive constants. 
For n  1 the agent is everywhere risk-averse over gains as postulated by KT. For  
n > 1 the agent is risk-loving (risk-verse, <, risk-neutral =) as n
rn
Gn >1 . 10 
10 Many studies assume that the value function takes the form  assumed by KT  and  
given this solve for the value of the weighting function parameters and value of the 
probability distortion parameters consistent with their choices in experiments. (see 
e.g. Stott (2005)  for a comprehensive survey). Where the KT form of value function 
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The expo-power function has the convenient property that as r  0 the function 
approximates the power value function, Gn .
We assume in our examples that the probability weighting function, w p( ) , has the 
form employed by KT and is given by 
w p p
p p
( )
[ ( ) ]
=
+ 

  1
1 (2) 
where p is the objective probability and  is a positive constant less than unity11.
We assume that probability weighting over gains and losses is that of CPT. 
Consider the two standard forms of the Allais experiments.  In experiment one agents are 
offered the choice between the alternatives A and A* and the alternatives B and B* 
where  
A:   a certain $X.   or     A*:   $X with probability p1 , $Y with probability p2 and $0 with 
probability1 1 2 p p .
B:  $X with probability  1 1 p or   B*:  $Y with probability p2 .
For instance Tversky and Kahneman (1992) set X=2400. Y=2500, p1 20 66 0 33= =. , . ..p
List and Haigh (2005) set X=7. Y=10, p1 20 75 0 25= =. , . ..p
is not assumed a number of studies  such as  Levy and Levy (2001,2002) ,Pennings  
and  Smidts (2000,2003) report  empirical evidence that many agents do not have the 
shape of value function conjectured by K and T.  We discuss in the paper some 
experiments which can, in principle, provide tests between the competing value 
functions. Much of the empirical evidence is “observationally equivalent”.  
 
11 Employing the weighting function of Prelec (1998) makes no qualitative 
difference to the results.   
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9
and  Conlisk (1989) sets X=5. Y=25, p1 20 89 01= =. , ..p .
In experiment two agents are offered the choice between the alternatives C and C* 
and D and D* where  
C: a certain $G or C* $H with probability p3
D: $G with probability p
h4
1
= or D* $H with probability, 
p
h
3
were h is typically set equal to 4 as in for example Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
with G=3000 ,  H=4000 and p3 08= . .
Under Cumulative Prospect Theory the choice between A and A* is given by  
U (X) or w p U Y w p p w p X( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]U( )2 2 1 2+ +  (3)  
Recalling that Y>X  
and between B and B* by  
 
w p U X p U Y( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 or  w  (4) 
That between C and C* by 
U G p U H( ) ( ) ( ) or  w 3
and that between D and D* by  
w
h
U G p
h
U H( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3or  w  (5) 
The typical majority choice patterns observed in experiment one when payoffs are 
large is A>A* and B<B* and for small payoffs A<A* and B<B*.  The typical choices 
observed for large payoffs in experiment two are C>C* and D<D*.  
Consistent choice under expected utility requires the choice patterns A>A* and B>B* 
or A<A* and B<B* in experiment one and C>C* and D>D* or C<C* and D<D* in 
experiment two. 
Manipulation of the choice pattern A>A* and B<B* informs us that a necessary 
condition for the Allais paradox choice pattern A>A* and B<B* is that  
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1 11 2 1 2 + >  w p p w p w p( ) ( ) ( )  (6) 
which, for example, for the Conlisk (1989) experiment is 
1-w (0.99)>w (0.11)-w (0.1)                                                                          (7) 
Substitution of the weighting function (2) into (7) reveals that any value of the 
distortion parameter less than unity is consistent with (7). Consequently epsilon 
probability distortion is consistent with the Allais paradox preferences A>A* and B< 
B*. Substitution also reveals that this is the case for the violation C>C* and D<D*. 
However we stress this is only a necessary condition. 
Consider the comparison between A and A* using the expo-power function (1). We 
choose between   
1 1 12 1 2  + +    e e w p p w p erX r X rX
n n nnor w(p2 )( ) [ ( ) ( )]( ) (8) 
where Y X	 
as we let payoff size X 0 (or r  0) by L’Hopitals rule we obtain from (8)  
that the choice is given by the same relationship as with a power specification of the 
value function,  namely a choice between  
 1 1 2 1 or  w(p2 )( ) ( )n w p p + + (9) 
Similar manipulation for choices B or B* gives   
w p p n( ) ( )1 1 2 or  w  (10) 
If we let payoff size become very large then the choice of A or A* is the choice 
between 1 2 1or  w( )p p+ and between B and B* by w p p( ) ( )1 1 2 or  w .
Consequently for large enough payoffs we would choose A and B and act as an 
expected utility maximiser regardless of the degree of probability distortion.  
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We note from (9) the important point that, ceteris paribus, the larger  the more 
likely the agent to make the choices A* and B*.  The Conlisk experiment had a value 
of  of 5 whilst that of List and Haigh had a value of  of 10
7
.
In Table 1 we tabulate the values of the distortion parameter required to make the 
choice A>A* and B>B* for various values of n assuming a power value function. 
We can deduce from Table1 that in List and Haigh’s experiments, given by 1a and 1b, 
if all the traders had a power utility parameter of n=0.88 and a distortion parameter of 
 =0.835 then they would choose A* and B* and behave as expected utility maximisers. 
Suppose students had the same probability distortion parameter of  =0.835 but were 
more risk-averse with n=0.5. They would choose A>A* and B*>B and exhibit the Allais 
paradox. Consequently List and Haigh’s experimental outcomes could reflect the fact 
that some students are more risk-averse over gains than traders not that they suffer 
greater probability distortion. 
One other interesting feature of their experiment is that the choice of A* by many 
respondents implies a higher value of  than postulated by KT and one which will 
mitigate against gambling at actuarially unfair odd  as we show below. 
If we consider the Conlisk experiment, 2a and 2b we observe that in order not to make 
the choices A* and B* respondents would have to exhibit extreme probability distortion 
with  <0.44.  
 In Table 2 where we report some values of r n and ,  for which an agent with the expo-
power value function would make the majority response in six experiments.  These are 
the three experiments above plus the Allais experiments involving the choices between 
C and C* and D and D*, also set out above, and in addition two of the important 
experiments of Holt and Laury (2002) who used real stakes. 
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In the Holt and Laury experiments agents choose between the “safer” gamble, M: 
which is $2x with probability p and $1.6x with probability 1-p and the “more risky 
gamble N: which is $ 3.85x with probability p and $0.1x with probability 1-p. p takes 
values between 0.1 and 1.  x is set at 1 or 20 in the experiments we consider. Their 
experiments suggest that the increases in payoff levels increase risk aversion with the 
switch between M and N occurring at different probabilities.  With a power value 
function this switch could not occur. Since these experiments use relatively small 
stakes the issue is not simply about the validity of the power function as an 
approximation to utility over large or small stakes. Whilst Holt and Laury did not 
investigate their outcomes from the perspective on non-expected utility we can 
employ their carefully crafted experiments in order to calibrate our non-expected 
model. 
The important point that emerges from Table2 is that an agent with an expo-power 
value function with r>0.00007 from experiment 4a and r< l 0.00016 from experiment 
3b, and  =0.95 and n=1.1, so that it takes the Markowitz form, will make the 
majority responses observed in the six experiments.  There may, of course, be other 
parameter combinations with even less probability distortion and the Markowitz form 
of value function, which can also explain the experimental evidence. However our 
example illustrates that the Markowitz model, with a much smaller degree of 
probability distortion than assumed by KT, can be consistent with important 
experimental evidence.  From an apriori perspective we think this important. It is 
apparently not widely appreciated how small differences between the objective and 
subjective probabilities imply large differences between the objective and subjective 
expected rate of returns of a gamble.  
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We define the expected return,µ , and the subjective expected return,µs , from a one 
unit gamble as respectively,  
µ 	  po p( )1 (11)                                      
 and 
µs w p o w p	  ( ) ( )1 (12) 
where p=objective win probability, o=odds and  
w p p
p p
( )
[ ( ) ]
=
+ 

  1
1 , w p
p
p p
( ) ( )
[ ( ) ]
1 1
1
1 =

+ 

  
with 0 1 1<   , .  0 <  
In Table 3 we tabulate some values of µs w p p, ( ) ( ) and w 1 corresponding to values 
of µ and p  employing the values of  and  employed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), namely = =0 61 0 69. , . , as well as the higher values of  = =0 95 0 95. , .  
suggested by our Markowitz calibration. We note that with the higher values of 
 = =0 95 0 95. , .  the subjective probability only differs from the objective 
probability in the third or fourth decimal point. Nevertheless the subjective and 
objective rates of return can differ by up to 25% in our examples. The values of the 
weighting function parameters over gains and losses assumed by Tversky and 
Kahneman imply positive subjected rates of return sometimes running into hundreds 
of percent for gambles with negative objective rates of return, for example exhibits 3, 
4, and 5.  A subjective expected rate of return of 239.27 for betting on a number at 
roulette, as in exhibit 3, when the true objective rate of return is –0.053, seems apriori 
too high to be systematically tenable.  
Of course because of the assumed risk-seeking segment of the value function, 
gambling at actuarially unfair odds can occur without probability distortion in the 
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Markowitz model. The KT model requires substantial probability distortion in order 
to generate subjective expected rates of return to overcome the risk-aversion assumed 
over gains.  
 To illustrate this we consider the expected utility from a gamble. 
Defining reference point utility as zero, expected utility in the Markowitz model with 
distortion or the KT model is given by  
Eu w p U so w p U s=  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 (13) 
where, U so( ) is the value derived from a winning gamble, where o are the odds and 
s the stake.  U s( ) is the disutility derived from a losing gamble.  
Employing the expo-value function we have   
Eu w p e w p k eso s
n n
=     ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1   (14)  
where we set r above in (1) as r =  a convenient parameterization for the analysis 
below.  , and k  are constants and other terms are as defined earlier. 
For the utility function in (14), the degree of loss aversion, (LA), is defined by the 
ratio of the utility gain to the utility loss from a symmetric gamble, given by  
LA e
k e
s
s
n
n=




( )
( )
1
1


(15)                                                                          
As stake size approaches zero, the assumption of loss aversion requires that 
k
< 1 ,
(by L’Hopital’s Rule), and as it becomes large that 1 1
k
< . Consequently the degree of 
loss aversion varies between 
k
and 1
k
In order to ensure that 


LA
s
0 , so that the 
degree of loss aversion does not decrease with an increase in stake size we require  
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that
d U s
U s
ds
r
l
( )
( ) < 0 , which for LA<1, implies that 

<


U s
s
U s
s
r l( ) ( )  for all s, which is 
consistent with the definition of loss aversion of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005)). For the expo-power function this implies the 
additional constraint that   1.  
The parameter values we employ are  = = =6 3 10 0 000071. , , . k and  n = 1.1  
With these parameter values the Markowitz agent makes the majority choices in the 
experiments involving gains reported above. How does the agent behave over 
gambles involving potential losses? Calculation informs us that the agent is happy to 
gamble at some actuarially unfair odds. For instance the agent will  
(a) Bet $1 on a number at roulette wheel, objective p = 1
38
, objective rate of 
return equal  –0.05263, bet $1 on a horse with objective p =0.01 and objective rate of 
return >-0.18, bet $1 on a lottery ticket with objective p=0.001 and objective rate of 
return>-0.38. 
In addition the agent will  
(b) Bet $10 at win probability, p= 0.5 if she wins in excess of $15.2312 
12 We recognise that our parametric Markowitz  specification is still subject to the 
Rabin criticism, (as originally applied to expected utility preferences). The  level of 
risk aversion observed with respect to the small gamble ( turn down a win $11 lose 
$10 at p=0.5) still  leads to a high, though perhaps less  absurd, level of risk aversion 
in that our agent would reject a win infinity lose in excess of $1513  gamble at p=0.5 
as opposed to infinity and $100 if an expected utility maximiser. However, e.g.  Safra  
and Segal (2006) have shown that  Rabin’s arguments apply to many non-expected 
utility theories. 
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(c) Will not accept a bet of lose $100 or win $150 at win probability 0.5, but will 
accept a sequence of two or more such bets. An outcome inconsistent with expected 
utility theory as shown by   Samuelson (1963).  
Cumulative prospect theory can, of course, also produce outcomes qualitatively 
similar to (a) to (c). However betting at actuarially unfair odds is rapidly curtailed as 
the degree of probability distortion is reduced. With the parameter values  
  = =0 0 69 and  n = 0.88,  k = 2.25,  = 0.61 and .  we have the model set out in 
Tversky and Khanerman (1992).  If we decrease the degree of probability distortion 
over gains and losses, so that  = 0.84 and   = 085. , the agent will make the majority 
responses found in the List and Haigh experiment. However  we now find that the 
agent will not accept any of the actuarially unfair gambles in (a) above and needs as a 
matter of fact to receive  an objective expected rate of return of in excess of 103% to 
gamble at objective odds of p=0.01 and in excess of 184% at objective p=0.001. 
 
Conclusions 
We show that in principal only a small degree of probability distortion is necessary to 
exhibit the Allais paradox. Also that in Allais experiments involving small real 
payoffs, even when agents exhibit probability distortion, majority preferences will 
often not reveal the Allais paradox if relative payoff ratios in the different components 
of the small payoff experiment are large. We also show that the choices observed in 
the Allais experiments employing small real payoffs, such as List and Haigh, cannot 
be explained by CPT without the assumption of much lower degrees of probability 
distortion than usually assumed in that model. However lower degrees of probability 
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distortion rule out gambling at unfair odds on all but the most extreme longshots in 
CPT. 
Given the above points we conduct a similar exercise as that Nielson and Stowe (2002) 
and ask if a calibrated version of the Markowitz function can be consistent with the 
majority outcomes observed in number of experiments. We show that this is possible. 
The Markowitz model of utility, supplemented by a small degree of probability 
distortion, can explain the majority choices involved in some Allais experiments over 
large and small payoffs, the experiments of Holt and Laury as well as gambling at 
actuarially unfair odds13. Given that the subjective expected returns required to induce 
gambling on long shots in the KT model are, at least from our perspective, apriori, too 
high to be credible, we consider this a major advantage of the modified Markowitz 
model. 14 
13 We are aware that a Fechner model of random errors as in e.g. Hey and Orme 
(1994) is potentially relevant in any particular experiment for explaining decisions 
between  lotteries A and B that only differ by small amounts of utility. However our 
purpose here is to illustrate that the Markowitz model is able, with a small amount of 
probability distortion, to explain majority choices in a large number of experiments 
without  recourse to, what appear to us, extreme assumptions about probability 
distortion.  
 
14 It is unclear whether Markowitz  was aware of the Allais paradox or simply gave it 
little weight when he wrote his pioneering paper. It  is perhaps interesting to speculate 
how different the future path of research would have been had he included epsilon 
probability distortion in his model.  
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There are a number of other experiments that would offer potential for differentiating 
between CPT and the Markowiz model. 
The first are  Allais experiments employing real stakes in which the  relative payoffs 
are closer together.  Consistent choice of the risk-seeking alternatives in such 
experiments would imply, from the perspective of  the KT model, that any probability 
distortion had to be minimal and consequently render the KT model unable to explain 
gambling at actuarially unfair odds.  
A second set of experiments which deserve further study are those of Battalio et al 
(1990). They  reported that the majority of their respondents  displayed  risk  seeking 
behaviour in choices over gambles involving small real gains  at probabilities of 0.5 
This finding is not explicable in the KT framework since it contradicts the 
subcertainty principle used to explain the Allais paradox (see KT, 1979,pp281-282).  
Of course such an outcome can be consistent with a Markowitz specification15.
Finally, as first pointed out by Cain et al (2003), the Markowitz model is consistent with 
the stylised properties of winning bets in the pari-mutuel pools to those obtained in the 
parallel bookmaking market whilst, as pointed out first by Paya et al (2005), the KT 
model is apparently not.16 . I particular agents betting on odds on favourites on the Tote 
 
15 For instance the majority preferred  $25 with p=0.5 or $5 with p=0.5 to a certain 
$15. With our parameters the risky gamble is preferred if r<0.0048.,  = =0 95 11. , . .n
16 Gabriel and Marsden (1990) in an innovative analysis compared the returns to 
winning bets in the British Tote with those offered by bookmakers at starting prices. 
They reported the striking finding that tote returns to winning bets during the 1978 
British horseracing season were higher at all bookmaker odds , on average, than those 
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offered by bookmakers. As noted by Sauer (1998) this result calls for explanation. In 
fact it appears from subsequent analysis that the relationship between tote returns 
and bookmaker returns for winning gambles is more complicated than reported 
by Gabriel and Marsden. Tote pay outs for a unit stake appear higher than 
bookmakers for long shot winners with the reverse apparently the case for favored 
horses: see Blackburn and Pierson (1995), Cain et al (2001) and Peel and Law (2007). 
Contrary to the assumption of Gabriel and Marsden Tote and Bookmaker returns are 
not the same asset. As stressed by Cain et al (2003)  bets on the Tote have uncertain 
payoffs whilst those with the bookmaker are essentially certain.  
Jensen’s inequality implies that 
EU G U EG( ) ( )> , EU(G) = U(EG) and EU(G) < U(EG) , as the agent is respectively 
risk loving, risk-neutral and risk-adverse over Gains, G. 
As a consequence as pointed out by Cain et al (2003) because the Tote pay-out is 
uncertain, ex-ante, whilst bookmaker returns are essentially known, ex-ante, 
expected returns would be expected to be equal on average only if the 
representative punter is risk-neutral, an assumption implicit in Gabriel and 
Marsden’s analysis. If the agent is assumed everywhere risk-averse over 
gains, as in the Cumulative prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky, it 
would appear that ex-ante they must expect a higher return from betting on 
the  Tote on either  favorites or longshots. Since the empirical evidence shows 
that Bookmaker payouts  are higher on average for favourites  than those on 
Tote  the model of KT cannot, apparently, explain this key empirical finding. 
On the other hand the Markowitz model, as pointed out by Cain et al (2003), 
because of the assumed risk-seeking behavior over favorites and risk-aversion 
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do not appear to be explicable in terms of the KT model so that they would appear to be 
prime agents for inclusion in experiments on risk-attitudes.  
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Table1:  Values  consistent with choices in Allais Paradox of  A>A*,  B>B* 
 
No.. Experiment   ,n  ,n  ,n 
1a A: 7  or 
A*: 0.2 of 10, 0.75 of 7 and 0.05 of zero 
n=0.5 
 any 
 
n=0.88 
 <0.832 
 
n=1.5 
 <0.64 
 
1b B:0.25 of 7 or B*: 0.2 of 10 n=0.5 
 >0.841 
 
n=0.88 
 none 
 
n=1.5 
 none 
2a A: 5 or 
A*: 0.1 of 25, 0.89 of 5.and 0.01 of zero 
n=0.5 
 <0.44 
n=0.88 
 <0.31 
n=1.5 
 <0.22 
2b B : 0.11 of 5  or B*: 0.10 of  25 n=0.5 
none 
n=0.88 
none 
n=1.5 
none 
3a A:2400 or 
A*: 0.33 of 2500, 0.66 of 2400 and 0.01 of zero 
n=0.5 
 any  
n=0.88 
 <0.96 
n=1.5 
 <0.85 
3b B: 0.34 of  2400 or B*: 0.33 of 2500 n=0.5 
 >0.74 
n=0.88 
 >1.2 
n=1.5 
 >1.87 
Notes; power value Gn , where G is gain and n is the constant exponent. 
Weighting function w p p
p p
( )
[ ( ) ]
=
+ 

  1
1 , where  p=probability and  is a 
constant. 
e.g  in 2a   is solution of 1n - w(0.1) 5n -[ w(0.99)-w(0.1)] 1n >0 
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Table 2: Values  of r Consistent with choices in Allais and Holt and Laury 
Experiments  for A>A* and B>B* 
 
No. Experiment   =0.61 
 n=0.88 
 =0.95 
 n=1.1 
1a A: 7  or 
A*: 0.2 of 10, 0.75 of 7 and 0.05 of zero 
 
r -any 
 
r>0.0825 
 
1b B:0.25 of 7 or B*: 0.2 of 10   
r>0.28 
 
r>0.1105 
2a A: 5 or 
A*: 0.1 of 25, 0.89 of 5.and 0.01 of zero 
 
r>0.265 
 
r>0.40 
2b B : 0.11 of 5  or B*: 0.10 of  25 r>0.745 
 
r>0.42 
3a A:2400 or 
A*: 0.33 of 2500, 0.66 of 2400 and 0.01 of zero 
r>0 r>0.00006 
3b B: 0.34 of  2400 or B*: 0.33 of 2500 r>0.0051 r>0.00016 
4a A: 3000 or A* : 0.8 of  4000  r- any  r>0.00007 
4b B: 0.25 of  3000 or B*: 0.2 of 4000 r>0.00115 r>0.0001 
5a A:  0.4 of 2, 0.6 of 1.6  or A*: 0.4 of 3.85 , 0.6 of 0.1 r-any r-any 
5b B:  0.8 of 2, 0.2 of 1.6  or B*: 0.8 of 3.85 , 0.2 of 0.1 r>0.265 r>0.713 
6a A:  0.4 of 40, 0.6 of 32  or A*: 0.4 of 77 , 0.6 of 2 r-any r-any 
6b B:  0.8 of 40, 0.2 of 32  or B*: 0.8 of 77 , 0.2 of 2 r>0.02 r>0.0262 
Notes; expo-power value 1 e rG
n
, where G is gain and n is constant exponent 
Weighting function w(p) as in Table1.  = 0 61.
e.g  in 5a  r is solution of  [ ( . )( ) ( ( . ))( )].w e w er r
n n
0 4 1 1 0 4 12 1 6 +      
[ ( . )( ) ( ( . ))( )]. .w e w er r
n n
0 4 1 1 0 4 1 03 85 0 1 +   >   
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Table 3: Subjective Probabilities and Subjective Rates of Return to a 1 unit    
stake at various Objective Probabilities and Rates of Return 
 
No. Objective Rate of 
Return,µ , and 
Objective win 
probability, p. 
 
Subjective Rate of Return, 
µs ,
Subjective  win  
Probability, w p( ) ,
and Subjective loosing 
probability,  w p( )1 ,
with  
 =0.61,  
 =0.69 
Subjective Rate of Return, 
µs ,
Subjective  win  
Probability, w p( ) ,
and Subjective loosing 
probability,  w p( )1 ,
with  
 =0.95,  
 =0.95 
1. µ =0, p=0.5 µs = -0.03348 
w(0.5) = 0.42065 
w(1-0.5) = 0.454 
µs = 0
w(0.5) = 0.49906 
w(1-0.5) =0.49906 
2. µ =0, p=0.1 µs = 0.90182 
w(0.1) = 0.1863 
w(1-0.1) = 0.7749 
µs = 0.10322 
w(0.1) = 0.11023 
w(1-0.5) =0.88889 
3. µ = -0.052632 
p= 1
38
=0.026316 
µs = 2.3927 
w(0.1) = 0.094035 
w(1-0.1) = 0.89853 
µs = 0.1289 
w(0.1) = 0.031349 
w(1-0.5) =0.96831 
4 µ = -0.5 
p= 1
100
=0.01 
µs = 1.763 
w(0.1) = 0.055266 
w(1-0.1) = 0.94509 
µs = -0.37241 
w(0.1) = 0.012548 
w(1-0.1) = 0.98729 
5 µ = -0.45 
p= 1
1000
=0.001 
µs = 6.9469 
w(0.1) = 0.014454 
w(1-0.1) = 0.98809 
µs = -0.22346 
w(0.1) = 0.001412 
w(1-0.1) = 0.99856 
Notes; µ =po-(1-p),  where o is odds.    µs =w(p)o-w(1-p),    where 
w p p
p p
p p
p p
( )
[ ( ) ]
, ( ) ( )
[ ( ) ]
=
+ 


+ 

  

  1
1 1
1
1 1 w = . 
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